Does Multimarket Contact Facilitate Tacit Collusion? Inference on Conduct Parameters in the Airline Industry

We nest conduct parameters into a standard oligopoly model. The conduct parameters are modeled as functions of multimarket contact. Using data from the US airline industry, we find: i) carriers with little multimarket contact do not cooperate in setting fares, while carriers serving many markets simultaneously sustain almost perfect coordination; ii) cross-price elasticities play a crucial role in determining the impact of multimarket contact on collusive behavior and equilibrium fares; iii) marginal changes in multimarket contact matter only at low or moderate levels of contact; iv) assuming that firms behave as Bertrand-Nash competitors leads to biased estimates of marginal costs

Public Policy and Market Competition: How the Master Settlement Agreement Changed the Cigarette Industry

This paper investigates the large and unexpected increase in cigarette prices that followed the 1997 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). We integrate key features of rational addiction theory into a discrete-choice model of the demand for a differentiated product. We find that following the MSA firms set prices on a more elastic region of their demand curves. Using these estimates, we predict prices that would be charged under a variety of industry structures and pricing rules. Under the assumptions of firms’ perfect foresight and constant marginal costs, we fail to reject the hypothesis that firms collude on a dynamic pricing strategy.Cigarettes, Master Settlement Agreement, Demand, Collusion, Rational Addiction.

Exit from the Hospital Industry

We study the exit of hospitals from the market for inpatient services. More generous hospital reimbursement significantly reduces the probability of exit throughout the 1990s. Conditional on reimbursement levels, hospital efficiency was not a significant determinant in the early 1990s but in the mid- to late 1990s, less efficient hospitals were significantly more likely to exit. Throughout the period, high-tech services increased the probability of survival, and for-profit hospitals were more likely to exit. The role of Medicare as a determinant of exit became less important in the latter half of the 1990s.Hospital Industry, Managed Care, Exit, Inpatient Services, Technology.

Were British cotton entrepreneurs technologically backward? firm-level evidence on the adoption of ring-spinning.

I study the slow adoption of ring spinning in Great Britain's cotton industry at the end of the 19th century, which has been used as evidence of British entrepreneurs' declining efficiency and conservatism (Musson, 1959; Aldcroft, 1964; Lazonick, 1981, 1981b). To this purpose I use firm-level data from all of Lancashire's cotton firms over several years. The data are from Worrall's The Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers' Directory for the years 1885, 1886–1887, 1890, 1894, 1902, and 1910. First, I show that the vertical organization of the industry, with its firms specializing in spinning or weaving, did not act as an impediment to the adoption of the ring spinning technology, as was argued by Lazonick. In particular, I show the following: i) non-integrated firms were the first to adopt rings in Great Britain; ii) the large majority of firms that adopted rings were incumbents; iii) vertically integrated firms that were spinning only either twist or weft yarn were still in existence in 1910; and iv) only a negligible number of firms changed their organizational structure upon adopting ring spinning. I also show that a large fraction of firms installed very small numbers of ring spindles upon the adoption of ring spinning, suggesting that firms were slowly adopting ring spindles to replace old mule spindles rather than transitioning over to ring spinning at a single point in time. Then, I show that the rate at which vertically integrated firms adopted rings suddenly accelerated after 1902. I interpret this as evidence that British entrepreneurs were fully aware of the technological complementarities between rings and automatic looms. These complementarities could only be fully exploited by vertically integrated firms

Were british cotton entrepreneurs technologically backward?

I study the slow adoption of ring spinning in Great Britain's cotton industry at the end of the 19th century, which has been used as evidence of British entrepreneurs' declining efficiency and conservatism (Musson, 1959; Aldcroft, 1964; Lazonick, 1981, 1981b). To this purpose I use firm-level data from all of Lancashire's cotton firms over several years. The data are from Worrall's The Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers' Directory for the years 1885, 1886–1887, 1890, 1894, 1902, and 1910. First, I show that the vertical organization of the industry, with its firms specializing in spinning or weaving, did not act as an impediment to the adoption of the ring spinning technology, as was argued by Lazonick. In particular, I show the following: i) non-integrated firms were the first to adopt rings in Great Britain; ii) the large majority of firms that adopted rings were incumbents; iii) vertically integrated firms that were spinning only either twist or weft yarn were still in existence in 1910; and iv) only a negligible number of firms changed their organizational structure upon adopting ring spinning. I also show that a large fraction of firms installed very small numbers of ring spindles upon the adoption of ring spinning, suggesting that firms were slowly adopting ring spindles to replace old mule spindles rather than transitioning over to ring spinning at a single point in time. Then, I show that the rate at which vertically integrated firms adopted rings suddenly accelerated after 1902. I interpret this as evidence that British entrepreneurs were fully aware of the technological complementarities between rings and automatic looms. These complementarities could only be fully exploited by vertically integrated firms

Were British Cotton Entrepreneurs Technologically Backward? Firm-Level Evidence on the Adoption of Ring-Spinning.

I study the slow adoption of ring-spinning in Great Britain's cotton industry at the end of the 19th century, which has been used as evidence of British entrepreneurs' declining efficiency and conservatism (Musson [1959], Aldcroft, [1964], Lazonick [1981, 1981b]). To this purpose I use firm-level data from all of Lancashire's cotton firms over several years. The data are from the Worrall's Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' Directories for the years 1885, 1886-1887, 1890, 1894, 1902, and 1910. First, I show that the vertical organization of the industry, with its firms specializing in spinning or weaving, did not act as an impediment to the adoption of the ring-spinning technology, as was argued by Lazonick. In particular, I show the following: i) non-integrated firms were the first to adopt rings in Great Britain; ii) the large majority of firms that adopted rings were incumbents; iii) vertically integrated firms that were spinning only either twist or weft yarn were still in existence in 1910; and iv) only a negligible number of firms changed their organizational structure upon adopting ring spinning. I also show that a large fraction of firms installed very small numbers of ring spindles upon the adoption of ring spinning, suggesting that firms were slowly adopting ring spindles to replace old mule spindles rather than transitioning over to ring spinning at a single point in time. Then, I show that the rate at which vertically integrated firms adopted rings suddenly accelerated after 1902. I interpret this as evidence that British entrepreneurs were fully aware of the technological complementarities between rings and automatic looms. These complementarities could only be fully exploited by vertically integrated firms

Were British Cotton Entrepreneurs Technologically Backward? Firm-Level Evidence on the Adoption of Ring-Spinning.

I study the slow adoption of ring spinning in Great Britain's cotton industry at the end of the 19th century, which has been used as evidence of British entrepreneurs' declining efficiency and conservatism (Musson, 1959; Aldcroft, 1964; Lazonick, 1981, 1981b). To this purpose I use firm-level data from all of Lancashire's cotton firms over several years. The data are from Worrall's The Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers' Directory for the years 1885, 1886–1887, 1890, 1894, 1902, and 1910. First, I show that the vertical organization of the industry, with its firms specializing in spinning or weaving, did not act as an impediment to the adoption of the ring spinning technology, as was argued by Lazonick. In particular, I show the following: i) non-integrated firms were the first to adopt rings in Great Britain; ii) the large majority of firms that adopted rings were incumbents; iii) vertically integrated firms that were spinning only either twist or weft yarn were still in existence in 1910; and iv) only a negligible number of firms changed their organizational structure upon adopting ring spinning. I also show that a large fraction of firms installed very small numbers of ring spindles upon the adoption of ring spinning, suggesting that firms were slowly adopting ring spindles to replace old mule spindles rather than transitioning over to ring spinning at a single point in time. Then, I show that the rate at which vertically integrated firms adopted rings suddenly accelerated after 1902. I interpret this as evidence that British entrepreneurs were fully aware of the technological complementarities between rings and automatic looms. These complementarities could only be fully exploited by vertically integrated firms

Were british cotton entrepreneurs technologically backward?

I study the slow adoption of ring spinning in Great Britain's cotton industry at the end of the 19th century, which has been used as evidence of British entrepreneurs' declining efficiency and conservatism (Musson, 1959; Aldcroft, 1964; Lazonick, 1981, 1981b). To this purpose I use firm-level data from all of Lancashire's cotton firms over several years. The data are from Worrall's The Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers' Directory for the years 1885, 1886–1887, 1890, 1894, 1902, and 1910. First, I show that the vertical organization of the industry, with its firms specializing in spinning or weaving, did not act as an impediment to the adoption of the ring spinning technology, as was argued by Lazonick. In particular, I show the following: i) non-integrated firms were the first to adopt rings in Great Britain; ii) the large majority of firms that adopted rings were incumbents; iii) vertically integrated firms that were spinning only either twist or weft yarn were still in existence in 1910; and iv) only a negligible number of firms changed their organizational structure upon adopting ring spinning. I also show that a large fraction of firms installed very small numbers of ring spindles upon the adoption of ring spinning, suggesting that firms were slowly adopting ring spindles to replace old mule spindles rather than transitioning over to ring spinning at a single point in time. Then, I show that the rate at which vertically integrated firms adopted rings suddenly accelerated after 1902. I interpret this as evidence that British entrepreneurs were fully aware of the technological complementarities between rings and automatic looms. These complementarities could only be fully exploited by vertically integrated firms